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I. I ntroduction
There has been real fru stratio n w ith th e SEC and other
governm ent agencies for not holding individuals responsible for
the excessive risk-taking th a t was a principal cause of the 2008 to
2009 global financial crisis (Financial Crisis) and its associated
banking failures.2 Enforcem ent has focused instead on th e
financial firms them selves.3
B ut being m anaged by individuals, firm s them selves are the
second-best targets of deterrence. Targeting m anagers in th eir
personal capacity is thus widely viewed as a greater, and perhaps
a more optimal, d eterren t th a n firm-level liability.4 B etter
deterrence is critical because insufficient deterrence could sow the
seeds—as m ay already be occurring—for fu tu re systemic
meltdowns. Targeting m anagers in th eir personal capacity can
also help to increase accountability and fairness.
Moreover,
firm-level liability
can
impose
significant
externalities on th ird parties.
The prosecution of A rth u r

2 See, e.g., Ted Kaufman: Wall Street Prosecutions Never Made a Priority, Frontline, PBS
(Jan. 22, 2013, 9:41 PM), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-econo
myfinancial-crisis/untouchables/ted-kaufman-wall-street-proseetions-never-made-a-priority/
(expressing frustration and disappointment with his own political party that there were no
prosecutions for the misconduct leading to the Financial Crisis).
3 In August 2012, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice determined that it had no
basis to prosecute Goldman Sachs employees in regard to allegations in the Levin-Coburn
report that Goldman Sachs made large profits from marketing CDO Securities backed by
subprime mortgage loans as safe investments to clients, while betting against the same
securities. See Dominique Debucquoy-Dodley, No “Viable Basis” to Prosecute Goldman,
Justice Department Says, CNN (Aug. 10, 2012, 7:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/09/busi
ness/goldman-justice-department/.
Goldman Sachs nonetheless paid $550 million is
settlement of civil claims with regard to the activity in question. Phil Mattingly et al., U.S.
Agencies Probing Goldman Findings After Senate Referral, BLOOMBERG (May 4, 2011, 12:01
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-03/Levin-report-accusing-goldman-of-d
eception-referred-to-u-s-justice-sec.
4 See Cedric Argenton & Eric Van Damme, Optimal Deterrence of Illegal Behavior Under
Imperfect Corporate Governance 26 (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2014-053,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540155 (arguing that
personal Lability is needed in addition to firm-level Lability to reach the optimal level of
deterring corporate moral hazard).
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A ndersen, for example, caused tens of thousands of employees to
lose th eir jobs . 5
Firm-level liability can also h u rt innocent
stockholders and creditors, who will suffer a loss in the value of
th e ir securities.
II. Systemic Risk Is Complicating What Risk -Taking Is
Excessive
To u n d erstan d why post-financial crisis prosecution has focused
so heavily on firm-level liability and not personal liability, I have
been exam ining changes th a t may be im peding th e imposition of
personal liability for excessive corporate risk -tak in g . 6 One of the
m ost im portant changes, which I would like to speak about today,
is th a t systemic risk is complicating the very concept of “excessive”
risk-taking.
O ur increasingly competitive and complex global economy
requires firm s to take ever greater risks to innovate and create
economic value. Because unsophisticated attem p ts to curtail
corporate risk-taking could inadvertently destroy th a t value , 7 it is
critical to be able to distinguish appropriate from excessive risk 
taking.
U ntil the Financial Crisis, it seemed relatively easy to m ake
th a t distinction by taking into account the consequences of
corporate risk-taking. M ost observers assum ed th a t a firm ’s
failure would prim arily, if not exclusively, h arm its investors.
Accordingly, corporate risk-taking was assessed—and therefore
“excessive” risk-taking was implicitly defined—by its potential

5 Robert Hennelly, Has General Motors Learned Its $900 Million Lesson?, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 18, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/has-general-motors-learned-its-les
son/.
6 See generally Schwarcz, supra note 1.
1 See Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2014), http://www.nytimes.eom/2014/01/22/business/economy/thecost.-nf-t.bp-finanrial-cviaia-ig.i]
till-being-tallied.html (observing that regulations that require financial institutions to
increase capital cushions to buffer against risks and potential losses have been criticized for
cutting into global economic output and reducing jobs).
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im pact on those investors, typically focusing on th e tension
betw een risk-seeking shareholders and more risk-averse
creditors.8
In most circum stances, the interests of shareholders would
trum p those of creditors,9 who, nonetheless, could try to bargain to
protect th e ir (risk-averse) interests through contractual covenants
in th eir loan agreem ents.
The responsibilities of a firm ’s
m anagers, who ru n the firm as agents for th e investors, to engage
in corporate risk-taking were therefore prim arily driven by
shareholder interests.
Moreover, th e enforcem ent of those
responsibilities was delegated to privately enforced rights, through
such m eans as shareholder derivative suits.
Systemic risk—in this context, the risk th a t a financial firm ’s
failure will im pact other financial firm s or m arkets, resulting in a
domino-type collapse th a t ultim ately h arm s the real economy—is
complicating corporate risk-taking, creating am biguity about w hat
am ount of risk-taking is excessive and confusing even corporate
law experts about w hen risk-taking th a t causes a firm to fail
should be penalized as excessive.10
The substantive source of confusion is th a t th e failure of a
“system ically im portant” firm can harm not only its investors bu t
also, by triggering a systemic collapse, the public a t large. C urrent
law does not require firm s to fully internalize th a t cost. As a
result, a firm may well decide to engage in a tran sactio n th a t is
expected to be profitable—thereby favorable to its investors and
th u s appropriate corporate risk-taking under existing corporate

8 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporations Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 679 (1996). Shareholders tend to be risk-seeking because they typically
benefit fully from an increase in a firm’s value but only are harmed by a decrease. Creditors
tend to be more risk-averse because they typically do not benefit from an increase in a firm’s
value and are harmed by a fall in the firm’s value that causes insolvency. Id. at 674.
9 See id. at 665 (“In general, directors of a solvent corporation owe fiduciary obligations
solely to shareholders.”).
10 Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard:
Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40
SETON Hall L. R ev . 1433, 1438, 1441, 1465 (2010) (observing the controversy over “whether
there is any such thing as excessive risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined”).

2015 ]

KEYNOTE REFLECTIONS

5

governance law—even though doing so could increase systemic
risk, since m uch of the h arm from a resulting systemic collapse
would be externalized onto other m arket participants, as well as
onto ordinary citizens im pacted by an economic collapse . 11
Nobody is speaking for the public’s in terest in avoiding systemic
h arm w hen firm s engage in corporate risk-taking. T h at voice
needs to be heard.
III. W hat S hould B e D o n e ?
I have separately exam ined various ways to impose personal
liability in order to control and internalize th e costs of excessive
corporate risk-taking . 12 I am also separately considering the
extent to which imposing personal liability should supplem ent, or
su b stitu te for, other ways of regulating control of th a t risk 
ta k in g . 13 Today’s ta lk focuses on imposing a public governance
duty, assum ing, arguendo, th a t should a t least supplem ent other
ways of regulating excessive risk-taking.
A. IMPOSING A PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DUTY

Because corporate risk-taking can im pact th e public in addition
to im pacting investors, one way of controlling excessive risk-taking
would be to require the m anagers of a system ically im portant firm
to ru n th e firm as agents, not m erely for th e investors, b u t also for
the public. To th a t extent, such m anagers would not only have a

11 This could be described as a type of “tragedy of the commons,” insofar as market
participants suffer from the actions of other market participants. Robert T. Miller,
Oversight Liability for Risk Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47,
110 (2010). But it also is a more standard externality insofar as non-market participants
(i.e., the ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse) suffer from the actions of
market participants. Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and
Limits of Law, 2012 WlS. L. REV. 815, 821.
12 See generally Schwarcz, supra note 1.
13 Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty (Duke Law
Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Series No. 2015-40, 2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=264
4375.
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private corporate governance duty to investors b u t also a public
corporate governance duty to society (public governance duty) not
to engage in excessive risk-taking th a t could harm the public.14
M anagers who breach this public governance duty should then
be—ju s t as m anagers who breach th eir private governance duty to
investors already are—subject to personal liability for breach of
th eir principal-agent relationship.
This reform ulation of corporate governance law raises several
practical questions about how a firm ’s m anagers should perform
th eir public governance duty:
• How should m anagers assess th e potential
im pact on the public of corporate risk-taking?
• How should m anagers balance public costs and
private benefits w hen deciding w hether th e firm
should engage in a given risk-taking activity?
• Who should actually sue to impose personal
liability on m anagers who breach th eir public
governance duty by engaging th e ir firm s in
excessive risk-taking?
Consider these questions in turn.

14 Cf. John Carney, Big-Bank Board Game Puts Shareholders in Second Place, WALL St .
J. (Apr. 5, 2015, 1:36 PM) (noting a speech by U.S. Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo
suggesting that “corporate governance would need to change to broaden the scope of boards’
fiduciary duties to reflect macroprudential [, i.e., systemic,] regulatory objectives”). The
nation of Iceland has actually enacted legislation that appears to require, at least in
principle, the managers of at least certain systemically important firms to
“operate] ] . . . [their firms] in the interests o f. . . shareholders . . . and the entire economy.”
Act on Financial Undertakings (Act. No. 161/2002) (Ice.) (unofficial English translation),
available at http://eng.atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is/laws-and-regulations/nr/nr/7366. The Dean
of the University of Iceland’s law faculty believes this law “puts clear constraints on the
directors and managers” of those firms and “underlines the difference between” those firms
“and other companies that usually have the only purpose of increasing shareholder value.”
E-mail from Professor Eyvindur G. Gunnarsson, Dean, Faculty of Law, Univ. of Ice., to
author (Feb. 14, 2015, 6:28 PM ) (on file with author).
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B. ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC

How should m anagers assess th e potential im pact on the public
of corporate risk-taking? As w ith any other type of corporate
action, it is difficult, ex ante, to precisely predict ex post
consequences. T hat difficulty would likely be even g reater w hen
predicting consequences to the public, not merely to th e firm and
its investors.
In the traditional corporate governance context, m anagerial
decisions—including risk-taking decisions—are protected to some
extent by the business judgm ent rule, which presum es th a t
m anagers should not be personally liable for h arm caused by
negligent decisions m ade in good faith and w ithout conflicts of
in te re st—and, in some articulations of the business judgm ent rule,
also w ithout gross negligence . 15 On its face, a t least, th e business
judgm ent rule should apply to m anagers trying to predict
consequences to the public of corporate risk-taking. B ut given
those public consequences, should the business judgm ent rule be
modified to m ake it easier to impose personal liability for excessive
risk-taking th a t causes systemic harm ?
In a trad itio n al context (i.e., w ithout regard to systemic risk), at
least two scholars have considered and rejected argum ents to
w eaken the business judgm ent rule for excessive risk-taking.
Professor C hristine H u rt has rejected any such w eakening of the
rule as im prudent and, insofar as the exercise of m anagerial
business judgm ent is inappropriate
for court
review,
unm anageable . 16 She also has said th a t it would be inconsistent
w ith corporate law principles to impose personal liability for poor
m anagerial judgm ent. It should be up to shareholders, she has
argued, to evaluate corporate risk through th e ir investm ent

15 Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 258-59 (2014).
16 Id. at 259-60, 289-91.
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decisions, not through litigation.17 Professor Robert M iller has
adopted sim ilar argum ents in rejecting any such w eakening of the
business judgm ent ru le.18
To the extent those argum ents assum e th a t shareholders
evaluate risk through th e ir investm ent decisions, th e argum ents
are irrelevant to th e question of imposing personal liability for
excessive risk-taking th a t causes public harm .
A firm ’s
shareholders would have no incentive—and th u s are highly
unlikely no m a tte r w hat the liability stan d ard —to sue m anagers
for engaging in excessively system ically risky actions. To the
contrary, shareholders generally w ant th e ir firm s to take
potentially profitable risks, regardless of the possible systemic
impact.
N onetheless, the inappropriate-for-court-review p a rt of those
argum ents should have m erit no m a tte r who, a shareholder or a
governm ent prosecutor, is attem pting to impose personal liability.
It generally would be im practical for a judge, who typically lacks
business experience, to review business m anagem ent decisions.
For two reasons, however, I believe th a t th e public in terest
requires some w eakening of the business judgm ent rule. M embers
of th e public, unlike shareholders, cannot m itigate th e ir h arm by
voting to replace m anagers or selling stock.
Even more
significantly, public harm breaches one of th e basic assum ptions of
th e business judgm ent ru le’s application—-that th ere be no conflict

17 Id. at 258 (“[Shareholders can sell shares of companies that are poorly managed, and
companies can fire poorly performing managers; imposing liability through a shareholder
suit is the least efficient way to discipline management.”).
18 Miller, supra note 11, at 103 (“Legally, any meaningful expansion of Caremark liability
would amount to a revolution in Delaware law tantamount to repealing the business
judgment rule, a result that would be so obviously inefficient as to be incontrovertibly out of
the question. Economically, even apart from the inefficiencies involved in repealing the
business judgment rule, the desired expansion of Caremark to control so-called excessive
risk taking would be misguided because the kinds of excessive risk taking that expanded
oversight liability are not the kinds of excessive risk taking that may have contributed to
the financial crisis.”).
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of interest .19 The interest of a manager who holds significant
shares or interests in shares, or whose compensation or retention
is dependent on share price, is aligned with the firm’s
shareholders, not with that of the public. To that extent, the
manager would have a conflict of interest .20
Managers who are conflicted in that way should not be given
quite the same absolute deference that the business judgment rule
gives non-conflicted managers. I therefore argue that the rule
should not protect conflicted managers who are grossly negligent—
that is, who fail to use even slight care.
Technically, this approach does not even change the business
judgment rule; it merely applies the gross negligence standard
that is articulated as part of that rule, though rarely utilized with
any rigor. And because courts routinely review whether other
types of actions are grossly negligent,21 they should not find it
inappropriate or impractical to review corporate risk-taking
actions under a gross negligence standard. As a practical matter,
furthermore, managers who follow a reasonable procedure to
balance public costs and private benefits—perhaps one akin to the
procedure next discussed—should be protected .22

19 Rachel E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized
Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. Law. 1, 31 n.202 (2008) (“Of course,
deference, in the form of the business judgment rule, is given to management decisions in
the absence of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders.” (citing Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).
20 I recognize that courts applying the business judgment rule usually look for conflicts of
interest between managers, on the one hand, and the firm and its shareholders, on the
other hand. Logically, however, if, as this Article argues, the managers should also have a
duty to the public, then the notion of conflicts should be broadened to include conflicts
between managers, on the one hand, and the public, on the other hand.
21 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Judge’s Ruling on Gulf Oil Spill Lowers Ceiling on the Fine BP
is Facing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/business/energy-en
vironmen/judge-sets-toppenalty-for-bp-in-deepwater-horizon-spill-at-nearly-14-bilhon.html?_r
=0 (observing that Judge Carl J. Barbier of the Federal District Court in New Orleans found
BP grossly negligent in causing the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill).
22 That would effectively conform the business judgment rule’s application to a duty of
process care, the standard commonly used in the United States.
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C. BALANCING PUBLIC COSTS AND PRIVATE BENEFITS

How should m anagers balance public costs and private benefits
w hen deciding w hether the firm should engage in a given risk 
taking activity? I have considered a som ew hat p arallel question in
the context of exam ining how m anagers of a firm in th e “vicinity of
insolvency,” who then ru n the firm as agents not only for the
shareholders but also for the creditors, should balance th eir ex
ante assessm ent of costs to creditors and benefits to shareholders
w hen deciding w hether the firm should engage in a given risk 
tak in g activity.23 In th a t context, I argued th a t “w here non
com parable commodities of benefit and harm to different parties
are being weighed, the benefit may have to considerably outweigh
th e harm . . . to be justified.”24
T hat approach follows a cost-benefit balancing th a t includes a
sem i-strong form of the precautionary principle. Precautionary
principles are applied w hen balancing the costs and benefits of
activities th a t can pose great harm —which in our case would be
systemic harm . The “considerably outweigh” requirem ent not only
shifts the burden to prove th a t the risk-taking activity should be
perm itted to the proponent of th a t activity bu t also requires a
m argin of safety.25 This sam e approach could be used to balance
the public costs and private benefits of corporate risk-taking.
U sing this approach, excessive corporate risk-taking should
m ean risk-taking for which the private benefits to investors are
not expected to considerably outweigh any systemic costs to the
public. M anagers who engage system ically im portant firm s in
such risk-taking would have violated th eir public governance duty
and thus should be subject to personal liability. The m anagers

23 Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 669-77.
24 Id. at 676-77.
25 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. Rev.
1003 (2003) (discussing an use of a precautionary principle that includes provision for a
margin of safety in regulatory efforts).
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nonetheless should be protected by the business judgm ent rule if
they acted in good faith and w ithout gross negligence.
One m ight ask why a norm ative analysis should ever weigh
costs and benefits to different p arties—in our case, a firm ’s
investors and the public.
One answ er is th a t public
policymaking—and indeed the very notion of cost-benefit
analysis—relies on the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency, under
which a public project is regarded as efficient if its overall benefits
exceed its overall costs regardless of who bears th e costs and who
gets the benefits . 26 A dm ittedly, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency implicitly
assum es th a t the distribution of benefits and costs is not controlled
by the party—in our case, a firm ’s m anagers—also controlling the
decision w hether to engage in the project .27 B ut those m anagers
do not completely control the distribution of benefits; the public
usually benefits, a t least indirectly, from corporate risk-taking
th a t benefits investors.
N ext consider expected value exam ples of how th a t weighing of
costs and benefits could be done. A ssume a system ically im portant
firm is considering engaging in a risky project th a t could be
profitable. The firm ’s m anagers value in good faith th e following
outcomes. They also perform at least a m inim ally appropriate
inquiry to reach th eir valuations. T hat would enable them to be
protected by the business judgm ent rule if, in retrospect, they
m ade incorrect valuations.

26 Richard A. P osner , E conomic Analysis of Law § 1.2 (6th ed. 2003).
27 R obin P aul Malloy, Law in a Market Context 190-91 (2004).

Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency aims to maximize society’s aggregate utility. Id. Legal reasoning concerning non
voluntary or non-consensual transactions employs the Kaldor-Hicks test as a hypothetical
efficiency standard in considering “what rules and institutional mechanisms might best
advance social welfare.” Id. at 191. Additionally “[w]hen a right is protected by a liability
rule it is subject to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis and can be subject to a forced exchange
if social utility can be enhanced.” Id.
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Expected, value of the project to investors (usually the
shareholders)
[(X% chance of project being successful) x $Y profit
from th a t success] — [(1-X% chance of project being
unsuccessful) x $W loss from th a t failure]
Expected value of the project’s systemic costs
[(1-X% chance of project being unsuccessful) x F%
chance of firm failing as a resu lt of th e project being
unsuccessful x $Z resulting systemic costs]28
W hat values should m anagem ent use? M ost of these values
would be pure business judgm ents about which the firm ’s
m anagers should have sufficient inform ation, or a t least much
more inform ation th a n th ird parties.
For example, those
m anagers should have much more inform ation th a n th ird parties
about valuing X%, the chance of the project being successful; $Y,
th e profit from th a t success; $W, the loss from th e project’s failure;
and F%, the chance of the firm failing as a resu lt of th e project’s
failure (i.e., effectively as a resu lt of the .5“W loss).
The exception, however, is the value for $Z, th e systemic costs if
the firm fails. G overnm ent financial regulators are likely to know
much more about valuing $Z th a n th e firm ’s m anagers. T hat
valuation should therefore be a public policy choice.
As a policy m atter, there could be several possible ways of
valuing $Z. One approach would be to assum e th a t th e firm
actually fails, w ith a system ically negative im pact to the real
economy. T hat would yield an indeterm inate bu t potentially huge
num ber for $Z. B ut th a t valuation approach could be m isleading

28 This equation has been simplified. The full equation would be [(1-X% chance of project
being unsuccessful) x F% chance of firm failing as a result of the project being unsuccessful
x $Z resulting systemic costs] + [(X% chance of project being successful) x A% chance of firm
failing as a result of the project being successful x $B resulting systemic costs]. However,
A%, the chance of the firm failing as a result of the project being successful, is likely to be
zero.
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for at least two reasons. First, the failure of any given firm, no
matter how large, would be unlikely by itself to be the sole cause of
a major financial crisis; even Lehman Brothers’ failure did not, by
itself, cause the Financial Crisis.29 Second, at least in the United
States, the “living will” requirement under the Dodd-Frank Act is
intended to minimize the systemic consequences of any given
systemically important firm’s failure .30
A more plausible way to value $Z would be to estimate the costs
of the firm’s failure to its immediate counterparties. The rationale
for this approach is that first-order systemic consequences are
much more likely to result from a systemically important firm’s
failure than a full-blown financial collapse. 31 Such a cost estimate
was done for the possible failure of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund whose losses in the
Russian bond market brought it close to default.32 Analysts at JP

29 See Edward J. Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic
Collapse—Lehman Brothers, General Motors, and the Secured Credits Markets, 45 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1111, 1115 (2011) (listing the collapse of Lehman Brothers as one of many factors
contributing to the global financial crisis).
30 Jennifer Meyerowitz et al., A Dodd-Frank Living Wills Primer: What You Need to
Know Now, 31-AUG. Am . BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2012) (“As part of the goal to remove the
risks to the financial system posed by ‘too big to fail’ institutions, § 165(d) of the DoddFrank Act requires ‘systemically important financial institutions’ to create ‘living wills’ to
facilitate ‘rapid and orderly resolution, in the event of material financial distress or
failure.’ ” (internal quotations omitted)).
31 This is especially true after the implementation of Dodd-Frank, which seeks to avoid
systemic disruptions in the event of a failed institution. As former FDIC Chair Sheila Blair
explained, “[T]he FDIC has come up with a viable strategy for resolving a large complex
financial institution . . . . The FDIC will take control of a holding company and put creditors
and shareholders into a receivership where they, not taxpayers, will absorb any losses. This
will allow the subsidiaries to remain operational, avoiding systemic disruptions, as the overall
entity is unwound over time. Mike Konczal, Sheila Blair: Dodd-Frank Really Did End
Taxpayer Bailouts, WASH. POST (May 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2013/05/18/sheila-bair-dodd-frank-really-did-end-taxpayer-bailouts/.
32 Cf. Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 149, 164 (2010) (observing that the Federal Reserve Bank facilitated “private market
solutions” by bringing “private lenders and investors together to work out a rescue plan for
Long Term Capital Management” (LTCM)); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193, 201 (2008).
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M organ estim ated th a t LTCM’s failure would have cost its larger
bank-creditors $500-$700 million each.33
A nother plausible way to value $Z would be to base it on the
estim ated cost of a governm ent bailout to avoid a systemic failure.
I will use this approach as an example, assum ing for illustrative
purposes th a t the firm ’s bailout cost would be $500 million. I’ll
also assum e th a t the firm ’s m anagers estim ate th e other values as
follows:

X% (the chance of the project being successful) = 80%.
$Y (the profit from th a t success) = $50 million.
$W (the loss from the project’s failure) = $20 million.
F% (the chance of the firm failing as a resu lt of the
project’s failure) = 10%.
Again, these values are solely illustrative. They rely on no h ard
em pirical data, and a q uantitative analysis is no b etter th a n its
assum ptions.
Applying these values to the expected value equations yields
the following:

Expected value of the project to shareholders
= [(80% chance of project being successful) x $50
million profit from th a t success] - [(20% chance of
project being unsuccessful) x $20 million loss from th a t
failure]
= $36 million
Expected value of the project’s systemic costs
- [(20% chance of project being unsuccessful) x 10%
chance of firm failing as a resu lt of the project being
unsuccessful x $500 million resulting systemic costs]
= $10 million

33 Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 237.
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If these values are realistic, the $36 million expected value to
investors would considerably outweigh th e $10 million expected
system ic h arm to the public. A system ically im p o rtan t firm th a t
u ndertakes th e risky project in question would not therefore be
engaging in excessive risk-taking.34
M uch will depend on valuing $Z, the systemic cost if th e firm
fails. In my example, if $Z were estim ated at $1.5 billion (rath er
th a n $500 million), the expected value of the project’s systemic
costs would equal $30 million.35 M anagers of a systemically
im portant firm th a t undertakes the risky project in question might
th en be charged w ith excessive risk-taking because th e expected
value of the private benefit ($36 million) to investors would not
considerably outweigh the $30 million expected value of the
system ic costs to th e public.
D. SUING TO IMPOSE LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF THE PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE DUTY

Who should actually sue to impose personal liability on
m anagers who breach th e ir public governance duty?
U nder
existing corporate governance law, shareholder derivative suits
are the prim ary m eans to impose liability on m anagers.36
Shareholders would have no interest, however, in imposing
liability on m anagers of th e ir firm for externalizing systemic harm .
Therefore, the governm ent, by default, should have the rig h t to
impose th a t liability.
I also argue th a t m em bers of the public them selves should be
authorized and incentivized to sue. As a precedent, qui tam suits

34 Cf. supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining that managers who follow a
reasonable procedure to balance public costs and private benefits should be protected,
thereby effectively conforming the business judgment rule’s application to a duty of process
care).
35 As mentioned, the valuation of $Z should be a public policy choice. If (as I suggest)
that valuation is based on the estimated cost of a government bailout to avoid a systemic
failure, the process of designating a firm systemically important could include estimating
that cost.
36 See supra note 1.
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under the False Claims Act are th e prim ary litigation tool for
com bating fraud against the federal government.
T hat Act
perm its private citizens to sue alleged defrauders in th e nam e of
th e U nited States governm ent.37 If th e suit is successful or settled,
the citizen-plaintiff is entitled to as m uch as 30% of the aw ard or
settlem ent.38
These types of law suits raise a standing question; the citizenplaintiff “suffers no i n j u r / ’ and th u s would appear to lack the
“injury in fact” required to create Article III standing under the
U.S. C onstitution.39 N onetheless, th e Suprem e Court has found
standing through a som ew hat circular argum ent—th a t the Act’s
“p a rtia l assignm ent of the federal governm ent’s claim to the
[citizen-plaintiff]” provides a sufficient stake in the outcome to
create Article III standing.40
T hat sam e circular argum ent could justify citizen standing to
sue to impose personal liability on m anagers who breach th eir
public governance duty, if those citizen-plaintiffs were entitled to a
percentage of the aw ard or settlem ent. Moreover, those citizenplaintiffs would have an additional standing claim: as m em bers of
the public, they would be directly harm ed by a systemically
im portant firm ’s collapse.

37 David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam
Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. Rev . 1913, 1944 (2014).
38 Id.
39 Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WlS. L. Rev 381 384
40 Id.

